Uh-oh... Looks like an American Airlines Boeing 737 suffered a runway excursion at Kingston, Jamaica today. Early reports indicate there was heavy rain at the airport, so hydroplaning could've been a factor. Looks like there was either a loss of directional control on landing and/or a runway overrun. The great news: No serious injuries have been reported!
More on this later...
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
You Snooze, You Lose
The FAA ordered an emergency revocation of the airline transport pilot certificates of the two pilots of Northwest 188 immediately following the October 21 incident. The pilots stated they were "distracted by their laptop computers." Yeah, right. Maybe they were dreaming about their laptop computers.
Whatever the case in the cockpit of that A320, it's clear the pilots became complacent. They had probably flown that route hundreds of times before. They thought it was a routine operation and that the flight would follow the same progression as previous flights. It did not. The pilots failed to maintain the high degree of vigilance required during air operations and placed hundreds of innocent people at tremendous risk. The fact that no one was hurt can be attributed to dumb luck.
Complacency kills. There's no place where that's more true than an airplane. The pilots of Northwest 188 were experienced, yet they failed in a very basic and fundamental way. All the experience in the world doesn't make a pilot immune to death by airplane. Most pilots have heard the story of the two Civil Air Patrol ATPs that flew a Cessna 182 into a mountainside near Las Vegas in 2007. That's stuff pilots learn how to avoid in the infancy of their pilot careers. Hours in a logbook made no difference that night at Mount Potosi. I'd argue all those hours even worked against these pilots by breeding complacency.
One of the world's best and most competent pilots, Richard L. Collins, has said, "Hours in a logbook aren't important because the most important hour is the next one." The next hour you spend in an airplane is the only one that has the power to kill you, and it will do so without hesitation if you allow it. Sometimes years of logbook pages only amount to blatant disregard and disrespect for the basics of aviation safety. It's as though some pilots think of hours in a logbook as a form of body armor which will protect a pilot from death in a crash. The truth is, a twenty thousand hour pilot is just as vulnerable to the risks of flight as a thousand hour pilot.
That thunderstorm in the windscreen doesn't care how many hours you have written on pages in some logbook. That mountain lurking in the night won't be any more forgiving to an experienced pilot, and an in-flight fire will feel just as hot to an airline pilot as a student pilot.
The risks stay present no matter how long or how far you fly. Risks don't diminish as logbook pages are filled. The dangers of flight don't discriminate between young and old, inexperienced or experienced, routine or nonstandard... We're all vulnerable. No one is exempt or immune from the risks of flight.
Remember the expression, "Stay alert. Stay alive." If you stay vigilant each hour you fly, you'll survive each hour you fly. Relax or become arrogant and the airplane won't tolerate it. The inherent dangers of flight will reach up and snatch you when you least expect it.
One of my favorite things about flying airplanes is the requirement to focus solely on the task at hand. I love how airplanes hold me accountable for that each moment I'm in them, and if I stray the airplane will remind me to re-focus because there's a lot at stake. Remember, all those hours in your past won't protect you from the most important hour, the next one.
Whatever the case in the cockpit of that A320, it's clear the pilots became complacent. They had probably flown that route hundreds of times before. They thought it was a routine operation and that the flight would follow the same progression as previous flights. It did not. The pilots failed to maintain the high degree of vigilance required during air operations and placed hundreds of innocent people at tremendous risk. The fact that no one was hurt can be attributed to dumb luck.
Complacency kills. There's no place where that's more true than an airplane. The pilots of Northwest 188 were experienced, yet they failed in a very basic and fundamental way. All the experience in the world doesn't make a pilot immune to death by airplane. Most pilots have heard the story of the two Civil Air Patrol ATPs that flew a Cessna 182 into a mountainside near Las Vegas in 2007. That's stuff pilots learn how to avoid in the infancy of their pilot careers. Hours in a logbook made no difference that night at Mount Potosi. I'd argue all those hours even worked against these pilots by breeding complacency.
One of the world's best and most competent pilots, Richard L. Collins, has said, "Hours in a logbook aren't important because the most important hour is the next one." The next hour you spend in an airplane is the only one that has the power to kill you, and it will do so without hesitation if you allow it. Sometimes years of logbook pages only amount to blatant disregard and disrespect for the basics of aviation safety. It's as though some pilots think of hours in a logbook as a form of body armor which will protect a pilot from death in a crash. The truth is, a twenty thousand hour pilot is just as vulnerable to the risks of flight as a thousand hour pilot.
That thunderstorm in the windscreen doesn't care how many hours you have written on pages in some logbook. That mountain lurking in the night won't be any more forgiving to an experienced pilot, and an in-flight fire will feel just as hot to an airline pilot as a student pilot.
The risks stay present no matter how long or how far you fly. Risks don't diminish as logbook pages are filled. The dangers of flight don't discriminate between young and old, inexperienced or experienced, routine or nonstandard... We're all vulnerable. No one is exempt or immune from the risks of flight.
Remember the expression, "Stay alert. Stay alive." If you stay vigilant each hour you fly, you'll survive each hour you fly. Relax or become arrogant and the airplane won't tolerate it. The inherent dangers of flight will reach up and snatch you when you least expect it.
One of my favorite things about flying airplanes is the requirement to focus solely on the task at hand. I love how airplanes hold me accountable for that each moment I'm in them, and if I stray the airplane will remind me to re-focus because there's a lot at stake. Remember, all those hours in your past won't protect you from the most important hour, the next one.
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Right-of-Way, The Right Way!
"Niner Four Charlie, traffic 12 o'clock, one mile, climbing through 2,100, opposite direction, a Cessna." That's the kind of traffic advisory that gets your attention. I was approaching the downwind at forty-five degrees for landing at my home base and was level at pattern altitude, 2,100 feet. I spotted the Cessna, less than a mile away and converging head-on with me. My brain unlocked the right-of-way rules folder which had been stored away for quite some time and was accumulating some dust. "Head-on, give way to the right," I recalled. I rolled into thirty degrees of right bank. The pilot of the Cessna evidently did not have right-of-way rules stored in his brain, or at least not correctly, because as I rolled right, he rolled left. From my seat, his airplane looked like a heat-seeking missile chasing after me! A quick roll back to the left and away from the Cessna remedied the situation, and I landed uneventfully.
This happened to me quite a few years ago, and since then I've never again encountered a head-on convergence situation. Few pilots do, and that's why right-of-way rules fall out of our brains after many years of disuse. But you'll need to know where to turn, possibly on short notice, in the event you do come near another aircraft. Don't make a mistake like the pilot of the Cessna did and interfere with evasive maneuver attempts by the other aircraft. Let's review a few of the key right-of-way rules:
This happened to me quite a few years ago, and since then I've never again encountered a head-on convergence situation. Few pilots do, and that's why right-of-way rules fall out of our brains after many years of disuse. But you'll need to know where to turn, possibly on short notice, in the event you do come near another aircraft. Don't make a mistake like the pilot of the Cessna did and interfere with evasive maneuver attempts by the other aircraft. Let's review a few of the key right-of-way rules:
- Remember, when converging with another aircraft head-on, always give way to the RIGHT.
- When converging with an aircraft of the same category other than head-on, the aircraft on the RIGHT has right-of-way (just like at an intersection in a car).
- When approaching an uncontrolled airport for the purpose of landing, the lowest aircraft within similar range of the field has right-of-way (and don't cheat by ducking lower just to cut in line!).
- When converging with an aircraft of a different category, the LEAST maneuverable aircraft has right-of-way (for instance, an airplane must give way to a hot air balloon or glider).
- An aircraft in distress ALWAYS has right-of-way over ALL other aircraft.
Remember also that tower controllers do not separate aircraft in the air; only aircraft on the runways and taxiways (airport movement areas) are positively separated. DO NOT rely on the tower to keep you separated from other traffic. They'll provide traffic advisories if they can, but you're responsible for seeing and avoiding threats all the way down to the runway.
Keep right-of-way rules accessible in your brain so they'll be there if you need them. Next time you need to give another aircraft right-of-way, do it the right way.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Brief or Grief
Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs) define an area of relatively high risk in instrument flying. The airplane is required to be maneuvered (sometimes extensively) close to the ground while executing course reversals, altitude and airspeed changes, and aircraft configuration changes. Margins between our aircraft and obstructions are reduced drastically in the approach environment. Approach procedures demand a high degree of situational awareness during a high workload and fast-paced phase of flight. There's a lot to think about and to manage, and no two IAPs are alike.
Airline crews have been conducting approach briefings for many years. Approach briefings are becoming common practice in light aircraft as well, as they should. Instrument approaches are no less risky or demanding for small airplanes than they are for jets. In fact, we quite often have lower approach minimums than the bigger, faster guys. The same degree of situational awareness is required, and often GA aircraft aren't equipped with the same level of cockpit automation and avionics as jets, nor do we always have two pilots. This means we need to be even more on our toes than crews of better-equipped jets. If you're not in the habit of conducting a briefing before every approach, here are a few guidelines to create an effective approach briefing.
The objective here is to familiarize yourself with the entire approach procedure long before you get to it. I usually look over anticipated approach plates during my preflight planning on the ground, then I conduct a formal approach briefing when "in range" of my destination, which I define as fifty miles from the airport. For trips less than fifty miles, I'll often brief the approach before takeoff so I'm not rushed in the air and so I don't allow myself to become task saturated during critical phases of flight. Instrument approaches can be very complex, and safe pilots approach them with a well developed plan for how the approach will be flown. Because all approaches are unique, a thorough study of the chart is critical.
Airline crews conduct approach briefings aloud between each other. I recommend conducting your own approach briefings aloud, even if you're the only pilot in the cockpit. Talk to yourself. If you have passengers onboard, let them know beforehand that you'll be going over the approach chart out loud and they don't need to listen. Use a crew isolation button if one is available on your intercom system. It's been proven that when we verbalize things as opposed to thinking them silently, they stick in our minds better. Pretend there's another pilot present if you need to and conduct your briefing.
Always start your approach briefings by positively identifying the approach chart. Chart identification seems excruciatingly obvious, but accidentally pulling the wrong chart can be a simple but deadly mistake. Verify you've selected the proper chart by reviewing the approach title and airport. This is also a good time to verify that you've got the required equipment on board and that it is operating properly. Remember, the equipment the approach requires is listed in the title itself (GPS can be substituted for certain items, such as DME and often ADF). Check the valid date range on the side of the approach chart and verify the chart is current. Any NOTAMs for the approach should've been received during your preflight briefing and marked on the chart.
After you've determined you've got the correct chart in front of you, begin working through the chart from top to bottom. Approach charts (both NACO and Jeppesen) are designed to be reviewed this way to provide the most critical information in logical order. Review the navaid/ground station frequencies, the final approach course, and the runway (if applicable) and elevation information. Work your way down to the notes/remarks section and approach lighting information, then review the communications frequencies.
Now move down to the plan view section. This is a top-down depiction of the approach procedure. First review the minimum safe altitude (MSA) for your sector and study any terrain or obstructions of concern along the approach segments. Determine which initial approach fix (IAF) you'll need to use if not receiving radar vectors, and review the lateral navigation requirements of the approach. Talk through the various approach segments' courses and intercepts, and review the procedure turn if one will be required. It's also good to mention at what points during the approach checklists will be conducted or configuration changes will be made as well as what automation mode will be used if flying with an autopilot.
Next, review the profile section. This section depicts the vertical profile of the procedure and provides altitude guidance. Identify minimum altitudes for all approach segments, and review any step-down fixes. Check the final approach angle to determine whether or not a deviation from a standard 3-degree descent will be necessary. This helps keep you ahead of the game and prepared for the unique considerations of each approach. Review the missed approach point (MAP) and determine how it will be identified (altitude, DME, time, GPS waypoint, etc.).
Arguably the most important step of the briefing comes next: A review of the approach minima. Check the minimums for your aircraft category and also note the required visibility and height above touchdown (or height above airport elevation for circling approaches). Disregard the numbers in parentheses as these are for military use only.
Finally, review the missed approach procedure (graphical and textual descriptions) and determine what type of hold entry will be necessary upon arrival at the missed approach holding fix. If you'll be using time to identify the missed approach point, review this information if its available on the chart. It's also helpful to look at the mini airport diagram and note where the final approach segment intersects the airport (especially if the approach is not straight-in).
When you're finished and satisfied with your review of the approach procedure, say "Approach briefing complete." Remember, in flying what you don't know CAN hurt you. Make sure you've got a thorough understanding of all chart symbology. If you're a bit rusty on chart elements, I highly recommend completing the AOPA Air Safety Foundation's (ASF) online course, "IFR Insights: Charts".
Managing risk during the approach phase is demanding. It subjects us to a complex and high workload task at the end of a flight when our abilities are often deteriorated by fatigue. Having a tactically-sound plan for executing an approach is critical, and conducting a thorough approach briefing is an important step in making an approach go smoothly and safely.
Airline crews have been conducting approach briefings for many years. Approach briefings are becoming common practice in light aircraft as well, as they should. Instrument approaches are no less risky or demanding for small airplanes than they are for jets. In fact, we quite often have lower approach minimums than the bigger, faster guys. The same degree of situational awareness is required, and often GA aircraft aren't equipped with the same level of cockpit automation and avionics as jets, nor do we always have two pilots. This means we need to be even more on our toes than crews of better-equipped jets. If you're not in the habit of conducting a briefing before every approach, here are a few guidelines to create an effective approach briefing.
The objective here is to familiarize yourself with the entire approach procedure long before you get to it. I usually look over anticipated approach plates during my preflight planning on the ground, then I conduct a formal approach briefing when "in range" of my destination, which I define as fifty miles from the airport. For trips less than fifty miles, I'll often brief the approach before takeoff so I'm not rushed in the air and so I don't allow myself to become task saturated during critical phases of flight. Instrument approaches can be very complex, and safe pilots approach them with a well developed plan for how the approach will be flown. Because all approaches are unique, a thorough study of the chart is critical.
Airline crews conduct approach briefings aloud between each other. I recommend conducting your own approach briefings aloud, even if you're the only pilot in the cockpit. Talk to yourself. If you have passengers onboard, let them know beforehand that you'll be going over the approach chart out loud and they don't need to listen. Use a crew isolation button if one is available on your intercom system. It's been proven that when we verbalize things as opposed to thinking them silently, they stick in our minds better. Pretend there's another pilot present if you need to and conduct your briefing.
Always start your approach briefings by positively identifying the approach chart. Chart identification seems excruciatingly obvious, but accidentally pulling the wrong chart can be a simple but deadly mistake. Verify you've selected the proper chart by reviewing the approach title and airport. This is also a good time to verify that you've got the required equipment on board and that it is operating properly. Remember, the equipment the approach requires is listed in the title itself (GPS can be substituted for certain items, such as DME and often ADF). Check the valid date range on the side of the approach chart and verify the chart is current. Any NOTAMs for the approach should've been received during your preflight briefing and marked on the chart.
After you've determined you've got the correct chart in front of you, begin working through the chart from top to bottom. Approach charts (both NACO and Jeppesen) are designed to be reviewed this way to provide the most critical information in logical order. Review the navaid/ground station frequencies, the final approach course, and the runway (if applicable) and elevation information. Work your way down to the notes/remarks section and approach lighting information, then review the communications frequencies.
Now move down to the plan view section. This is a top-down depiction of the approach procedure. First review the minimum safe altitude (MSA) for your sector and study any terrain or obstructions of concern along the approach segments. Determine which initial approach fix (IAF) you'll need to use if not receiving radar vectors, and review the lateral navigation requirements of the approach. Talk through the various approach segments' courses and intercepts, and review the procedure turn if one will be required. It's also good to mention at what points during the approach checklists will be conducted or configuration changes will be made as well as what automation mode will be used if flying with an autopilot.
Next, review the profile section. This section depicts the vertical profile of the procedure and provides altitude guidance. Identify minimum altitudes for all approach segments, and review any step-down fixes. Check the final approach angle to determine whether or not a deviation from a standard 3-degree descent will be necessary. This helps keep you ahead of the game and prepared for the unique considerations of each approach. Review the missed approach point (MAP) and determine how it will be identified (altitude, DME, time, GPS waypoint, etc.).
Arguably the most important step of the briefing comes next: A review of the approach minima. Check the minimums for your aircraft category and also note the required visibility and height above touchdown (or height above airport elevation for circling approaches). Disregard the numbers in parentheses as these are for military use only.
Finally, review the missed approach procedure (graphical and textual descriptions) and determine what type of hold entry will be necessary upon arrival at the missed approach holding fix. If you'll be using time to identify the missed approach point, review this information if its available on the chart. It's also helpful to look at the mini airport diagram and note where the final approach segment intersects the airport (especially if the approach is not straight-in).
When you're finished and satisfied with your review of the approach procedure, say "Approach briefing complete." Remember, in flying what you don't know CAN hurt you. Make sure you've got a thorough understanding of all chart symbology. If you're a bit rusty on chart elements, I highly recommend completing the AOPA Air Safety Foundation's (ASF) online course, "IFR Insights: Charts".
Managing risk during the approach phase is demanding. It subjects us to a complex and high workload task at the end of a flight when our abilities are often deteriorated by fatigue. Having a tactically-sound plan for executing an approach is critical, and conducting a thorough approach briefing is an important step in making an approach go smoothly and safely.
Saturday, November 14, 2009
PIREPs
Ever get home from a flight and check ADDS or DUATS to see if your PIREP was entered correctly, only to find it's not there at all? This has happened to most pilots at least once. It's a bit frustrating because Flight Service Specialists and the FAA are always encouraging us to submit PIREPs as often as possible, not to mention it's required by regulation to report unforecast weather conditions. As pilots, we value PIREPs because they help us put together an accurate picture of the weather conditions that are actually existing. That's why it's a bummer when we go to the trouble of giving reports and then have them get lost in the shuffle.
I once got my butt kicked in mountain wave turbulence while flying in IMC over the Ouchita Mountains in Arkansas. There was no AIRMET or forecast for the turbulence before, during, or after my flight. I made a PIREP to the controller and described the turbulence as "continuous moderate chop." There may've been an occasional "severe" bump or two in there. The controller acknowledged my transmission, I landed and checked ADDS, and my PIREP was nowhere to be found. At least I did my part. I guess the controller didn't do his.
I was browsing through ASRS reports yesterday. That's something I do every so often just to see what kinds of issues pilots are reporting. One pilot made a report about his PIREP not being filed and suggested that the FAA consider implementing an online interface that would allow pilots to enter their own PIREPs once on the ground. You know, that's not a bad idea.
The only problem would be the time delay, but filing a delayed report is better than having your report never make it into the system at all. I could see how an online PIREP system like this could be easily created in DUATS. Seems cheap and feasible.
The best solution, though, would be for controllers (and Flight Service Specialists, although I have a hunch controllers are worse about this because they tend to have higher workloads) to reliably and consistently enter PIREPs into the system every time.
If they want us to give them, they need to let us know they're valued and appreciated. I bet there will be an online PIREP submission system up and running within the next five years. Let's see if I'm right...
I once got my butt kicked in mountain wave turbulence while flying in IMC over the Ouchita Mountains in Arkansas. There was no AIRMET or forecast for the turbulence before, during, or after my flight. I made a PIREP to the controller and described the turbulence as "continuous moderate chop." There may've been an occasional "severe" bump or two in there. The controller acknowledged my transmission, I landed and checked ADDS, and my PIREP was nowhere to be found. At least I did my part. I guess the controller didn't do his.
I was browsing through ASRS reports yesterday. That's something I do every so often just to see what kinds of issues pilots are reporting. One pilot made a report about his PIREP not being filed and suggested that the FAA consider implementing an online interface that would allow pilots to enter their own PIREPs once on the ground. You know, that's not a bad idea.
The only problem would be the time delay, but filing a delayed report is better than having your report never make it into the system at all. I could see how an online PIREP system like this could be easily created in DUATS. Seems cheap and feasible.
The best solution, though, would be for controllers (and Flight Service Specialists, although I have a hunch controllers are worse about this because they tend to have higher workloads) to reliably and consistently enter PIREPs into the system every time.
If they want us to give them, they need to let us know they're valued and appreciated. I bet there will be an online PIREP submission system up and running within the next five years. Let's see if I'm right...
Sunday, October 25, 2009
NWA 188
Last Wednesday a Northwest Airlines Airbus A320 overflew its intended destination airport by at least 150 miles before reversing course and proceeding inbound to land. The A320 was operating as Northwest Flight 188 with service from San Diego to Minneapolis/St. Paul (MSP). What the heck happened?
We're not sure yet. After landing the crew was interviewed by the FBI and airport police at which time they admitted they were in a heated conversation about airline policy which caused a loss of situational awareness on the flight deck. If that's true, the conversation must've been pretty darn heated because it takes a colossal episode of inattention to fly beyond the TOD (top of descent) point, then continue flying for another 250-300 miles while missing repeated calls from air traffic control. I don't fly A320s, but every modern airline jet that I know of will automatically alert the crew in some way, even if minimally, when the TOD is reached without a descent being initiated. That means the crew of Flight 188 had to ignore messages from both their aircraft and ATC for hundreds of miles.
Were both pilots asleep? Maybe. The pilots denied this during interviews, but it doesn't sound impossible to me. The aircraft's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) will be reviewed and we'll find out what really happened to cause such an extraordinary foul up.
People wonder, were the passengers at risk? Of course! No matter what the case was on the flight deck, sleeping pilots, arguing pilots, whatever, there was no one in command of that aircraft for hundreds of miles. That has all sorts of implications on flight safety. The pilots could've missed a developing mechanical problem as they were obviously not actively monitoring the aircraft's systems, a low fuel situation could've developed, the aircraft could've wandered even further off course, or any number of other dangerous situations could've developed.
Any pilot incompetent enough to allow something like this to happen is probably stupid enough to lie about it too. Luckily, the CVR will reveal the truth. More regulations are certain to be born at the conclusion of this investigation about cockpit crew conduct during cruise flight. When a couple of clowns screw up, it creates a mess and new restrictions for the rest of us, including the good guys.
We're not sure yet. After landing the crew was interviewed by the FBI and airport police at which time they admitted they were in a heated conversation about airline policy which caused a loss of situational awareness on the flight deck. If that's true, the conversation must've been pretty darn heated because it takes a colossal episode of inattention to fly beyond the TOD (top of descent) point, then continue flying for another 250-300 miles while missing repeated calls from air traffic control. I don't fly A320s, but every modern airline jet that I know of will automatically alert the crew in some way, even if minimally, when the TOD is reached without a descent being initiated. That means the crew of Flight 188 had to ignore messages from both their aircraft and ATC for hundreds of miles.
Were both pilots asleep? Maybe. The pilots denied this during interviews, but it doesn't sound impossible to me. The aircraft's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) will be reviewed and we'll find out what really happened to cause such an extraordinary foul up.
People wonder, were the passengers at risk? Of course! No matter what the case was on the flight deck, sleeping pilots, arguing pilots, whatever, there was no one in command of that aircraft for hundreds of miles. That has all sorts of implications on flight safety. The pilots could've missed a developing mechanical problem as they were obviously not actively monitoring the aircraft's systems, a low fuel situation could've developed, the aircraft could've wandered even further off course, or any number of other dangerous situations could've developed.
Any pilot incompetent enough to allow something like this to happen is probably stupid enough to lie about it too. Luckily, the CVR will reveal the truth. More regulations are certain to be born at the conclusion of this investigation about cockpit crew conduct during cruise flight. When a couple of clowns screw up, it creates a mess and new restrictions for the rest of us, including the good guys.
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
"I Knew I Could Do It."
I had the honor and privilege of meeting Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger this evening in Kansas City. Captain Sullenberger came into town to promote his new book and talk a little about the events of January 15, 2009, the day that changed his life forever.As Sully described the events of the famous Hudson ditching, he said something that struck me. The interviewer reviewed the difficult situation Sully was faced with while descending toward the Hudson and asked Sully what went through his mind that day, and Sully said, "I knew I could do it."
He did do it. Exactly as it needed to be done.
For pilots, visualizing the circumstances we wish to create is important. "Armchair flying" has been around for years -- the process of sitting in a chair, closing your eyes, and visualizing yourself in an airplane going through the motions of an upcoming mission. The Blue Angels Navy flight demonstration team performs this exercise as a group before every show. The pilots sit in a circle, close their eyes, and hold an imaginary stick and throttle as the leader talks through the routine.
By visualizing where we want to go or what we want to do, we're paving the road in our brains that our outside experience will soon follow. Captain Sullenberger knew what he needed to do, and he knew he could do it. His Airbus 320 followed the path to a successful outcome that his mind had already laid out.
When faced with an in-flight emergency, know that you can do it too. Visualize the circumstances you must create in order to survive, then carry out what needs to be done to bring those circumstances about. Panic comes from thinking you might not be able to survive, and unfortunately, pilots who doubt their ability to pull through an in-flight emergency often don't make it.
Superior airmanship means staying calm, being confident, thinking positively, and remaining in charge of even the most difficult situation. Sully did these things, and so can you.
By visualizing where we want to go or what we want to do, we're paving the road in our brains that our outside experience will soon follow. Captain Sullenberger knew what he needed to do, and he knew he could do it. His Airbus 320 followed the path to a successful outcome that his mind had already laid out.
When faced with an in-flight emergency, know that you can do it too. Visualize the circumstances you must create in order to survive, then carry out what needs to be done to bring those circumstances about. Panic comes from thinking you might not be able to survive, and unfortunately, pilots who doubt their ability to pull through an in-flight emergency often don't make it.
Superior airmanship means staying calm, being confident, thinking positively, and remaining in charge of even the most difficult situation. Sully did these things, and so can you.
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